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Abstract 
In recent years, both endogenous capital accumulation and institutional theories of economic 
growth have emerged as central sources for explaining uneven development across cities and 
regions. This paper seeks to connect both theoretical stances as a means of explaining urban 
and regional growth differentials. It conceptualises urban economies as growth systems 
combining the interaction between capital and institutions at the firm, inter-firm and spatial 
level. In these systems, the capital drivers of growth are not merely the result of preferences 
and existing capital endowments, but are mediated by a set of institutional factors. 
 
Introduction 
Over a number of years the identification of the determinants of economic growth has 
emerged as one of the most intriguing streams of inquiry in the fields of economic geography 
and spatial economies. As Lucas (1988) put it, ‘once you start thinking about growth it is 
difficult to think about anything else’. As a result, urban and regional growth theory has 
increasingly drawn on the notion that the growth of cities is endogenous, with it stemming 
from a city’s capability to invest in a range of intangible assets, in particular human capital 
(Lucas, 1988), innovation (Romer, 1986; 1990), as well as more contemporary factors such 
as entrepreneurship capital (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004a, b, 2008) and network capital 
(Huggins and Thompson, 2014a; 2015a). The key argument of urban and regional 
endogenous growth theory is that these assets provide cities with the capability to facilitate 
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long-term growth (Johansson et al., 2001; Capello and Nijkamp, 2009; Capello, 2011; 
Stimson et al., 2011). Therefore, long-term differentials in growth across cities and regions 
will emerge as a result of differences in the structure of their economic systems, especially 
their endowment of these assets and the preferences of economic agents and actors. 
Alongside the endogenous capital accumulation model of regional growth, however, an 
emerging field of economic study has sought to cut into the growth debate at a different level 
by placing the concepts of institutions as the central source for understanding uneven urban 
and regional development and growth differentials (Farole et al., 2011; Rodríguez-Pose, 
2013; Tomaney, 2014). 
Endogenous capital accumulation theories of growth are based on preferences, 
endowment, resource allocation, and intentional investment decisions (Romer, 1986; 1990). 
Institutional theories of growth, on the other hand, are based on constraints, incentives, and 
organisational arrangements (North, 2005; Acemoglu and Robminson, 2012). Although these 
two theoretical positions are usually considered as distinctive explanations of economic 
growth differences, it is interesting to consider the extent to which they may interact given 
that both theories can be considered to be endogenous in nature (Acemoglu et al., 2005; 
Farole et al., 2011). For example, preferences and investment decisions may be shaped by 
prevailing institutions, whilst the availability and accumulation of capital may shape 
incentive structures and organisational arrangements. Furthermore, an institutional approach 
facilitates a consideration of the ownership structure of stocks of capital. 
Scott and Storper (2015) allude to the interrelation between capital and institutions 
when they highlight the joint role played by the dynamics of agglomeration and the nexus of 
locations, land uses and human interactions in understanding urban development. However, 
despite the implicit connection between the two perspectives on growth differentials, there 
has been little work, with only a few notable exceptions (e.g. Stimson et al., 2009), that has 
sought to more explicitly understand or frame the relationship between them. 
The aim of this paper is to seek to develop a more transparent link between 
institutional and capital accumulation theories of growth from the viewpoint of analysing 
differentials across cities and regions. It seeks to establish a theoretical framework that draws 
on the institutional and capital accumulation theories of growth as a means of developing a 
systems-based conceptualisation of urban and regional growth. It conceptualises urban 
economies as growth systems through which different forms of institutions are associated 
with different forms of capital accumulation. In this model, the capital drivers of growth are 
not merely the result of preferences and existing capital endowments, but are mediated by a 
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set of institutional factors. The paper builds on the existing acknowledgement that both 
capital and institutional factors relating to the nature, quality and performance of: (1) firms 
with in a city or region; (2) inter-firm connections stemming from markets and networks; and 
(3) the governance of the urban political economy are key determinants of differential 
patterns of spatial economic growth. 
The existing literature, however, is limited in fully explaining the types of capital and 
institutional factors that impact on the growth dynamics associated with the firm, inter-firm 
or urban and regional level as a whole. Therefore, the paper presents a more granular analysis 
that identifies with greater specificity the range of ‘capitals’ and institutions, and the 
relationships between them, that are required to be accounted for when addressing questions 
relating to why some cities and regions grow faster than others, as well as identifying those 
cities and regions that are best placed to achieve the highest future rates of economic growth. 
As a means of articulating the potential methodological value of this approach, the paper 
outlines how the theoretical framework may be employed in both quantitative and qualitative 
empirical research strategies. 
The approach adopted here echoes the notion of cities as ‘Schumpeterian hubs’ for 
recombining capital in order to generate innovation (Veltz, 2004; Storper and Manville, 
2006). Merely investing in such capital, however, may not be enough to secure high growth 
urban systems (Storper, 2013). Therefore, although capital accumulation may be able to 
partly explain economic growth, institutions in the form of the incentives and constraints 
relating to the organisation of production and the capability to accumulate capital are 
potentially more fundamental determinants of economic growth (Helpman, 2004; Tomaney, 
2014). In particular, the paper seeks to extend and integrate conceptions of urban growth by 
meshing theories relating to territorialised modes of capital orchestration with emerging 
institutional theories of urban and regional development. 
Fundamentally, the article proposes that urban growth systems constitute the 
interaction between capital and institutions with respect to three forms of organisational 
arrangements: firms; markets and networks; and the governance of the political economy. 
Firm-level growth dynamics concern the role of human capital and knowledge capital and the 
learning and innovation institutions that constrain or incentivise the accumulation of these 
forms of capital. Inter-firm level growth dynamics concern the transactions and interactions 
between firms through the markets and networks they form, and the role of entrepreneurship 
capital and entrepreneurial institutions in market processes, as well as the network capital and 
associational institutions required to facilitate knowledge flows. Urban and regional level 
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growth dynamics relate to the overall governance of urban and regional political economies, 
especially with regard to the institutions of ownership and the allocation of physical capital. 
In order to achieve its aims, the remainder of the article is structured as follows. The 
next two sections critique the key literature concerning the role, respectively, of capital 
accumulation and institutions in determining economic growth. Drawing on this critique, the 
article presents a systems model for delineating the major capital and institutional variables 
underpinning urban and regional growth and the proposed connection between them. This 
model is then utilised to consider the establishment of empirical research strategies by which 
to operationalise the proposed theoretical framework. 
 
Capital Accumulation and Urban Economic Growth 
The success of cities and regions will clearly be related to their capacity and capability to 
achieve economic growth, and understanding how and why such growth occurs is central to a 
number of research streams. For instance, research in spatial economics seeks to understand 
the role of agglomeration effects, trade costs, and other urbanisation factors (Storper, 2010). 
More generally, contributions from economic geography and spatial economics have become 
increasingly concerned with understanding and demonstrating the urban and regional micro-
foundations of macroeconomic growth models (Capello, 2011; Stimson et al., 2011). Urban 
theorists have often focused on the socially unequal processes and outcomes of urban growth, 
arguing that it often the preserve of, and driven by, elite regimes, machines and coalitions 
(Harding, 1994; 1997; Harding and Blokland, 2014). Endogenous growth theory, on the other 
hand, has focused on the role of human capital, knowledge and innovation in city and 
regional growth processes, with a need to better understand the mechanisms underlying urban 
growth patterns identified as a key priority in aiding effective economic development policy 
(Stimson et al., 2011; Duranton and Puga, 2013). 
Endogenous capital accumulation models are to some extent allied to contributions 
related to the New Economic Geography (Krugman, 1991), which, like antecedents such as 
models of circular and cumulative causation (Hirschman, 1958; Myrdal, 1957; Kaldor, 1957), 
emphasise the notion of increasing returns from capital investment (Storper and Scott, 2009). 
Similarly, work on urban and regional competitiveness has sought to pinpoint the ‘territorial 
capital’ of cities, which covers the wider set of natural, human, relational, and organisational 
assets promoting economic growth (Camagni et al., 2009; Camagni and Capello, 2013; 
Huggins et al., 2014). Such a conceptualisation of the factors underlying growth are 
consistent with wider views from the field of economics, whereby economic growth is 
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dependent on capital accumulation (Duranton and Puga, 2013). However, it departs from the 
traditional view which places the accumulation of physical capital at the centre of 
explanations of growth differentials (Solow, 1956; 1957; Swan, 1956). Instead, it relates 
more to a Schumpeterian perspective that highlights the role of intellectual capital, 
principally concerning the creation and accumulation of knowledge as the principal driver of 
growth differentials (Boschma and Martin, 2010; Cooke et al., 2011). The entrepreneurial, 
knowledge, and innovation capacity of cities and regions are generally considered to be key 
factors impacting upon the future economic development and growth trajectory of regions, 
and are strongly tied to the lineage of Schumpeterian theory (Schumpeter, 1934), as well as 
more contemporary theories relating to the endogenous nature of economic growth. 
Theorists of economic development have increasingly drawn upon models of 
endogenous growth to better understand the factors determining such development 
(Johansson et al., 2001; Andersson and Karlsson, 2007). Importantly, the use of the term 
endogenous is a recognition of the argument that economic growth is influenced by the use of 
investment resources generated by economies themselves, rather than the exogenous factors 
associated with traditional growth models (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998). For instance, a Lucas-type (Lucas, 1988) production function model of urban 
growth may take the form of: 
 
Yc = F(Hc, Kc,)        (1) 
 
Where Y = is the change in economic output of a city (c); K= the stock of physical capital in 
the city and H= the stock of human capital. 
Romer (1986), however, specifies a model of long-run growth in which knowledge is 
assumed to be an input into production that has increasing marginal productivity. Adapting 
Romer’s (1986) model to the urban context, it can be proposed that the output of a city (c) is 
a function of not only physical capital and human capital, but also the stock of knowledge or 
research capital: 
 
Yc = F(Hc, Rc, Kc)       (2) 
 
Where R= a city’s stock of knowledge or research capital. 
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These models make clear that growth is considered to be driven by the technological change 
arising from intentional investment decisions made by profit-maximizing agents, with the 
stock of differing forms of capital – and investments in such capital – determining the rate of 
growth (Romer, 1990; Ha and Howitt, 2007). However, whilst endogenous growth can be 
considered the desired outcome of knowledge-based development and innovation, it is the 
process of endogenous development that is the foundation of the growth trajectories of 
economies (Vázquez-Barquero, 2007). In particular, cities and regions are increasingly 
considered to be key territorial units within which endogenous forms of development flourish 
through their innovative milieu – or what some have referred to as ‘technopoles’ (Castells 
and Hall, 1994), ‘industrial districts’ (Capello, 1999), or ‘clusters’ (Porter, 1998) – 
facilitating knowledge flow and new knowledge creation. 
 
Institutions and Urban Economic Growth 
Somewhat contrary to the capital accumulation model of urban and regional growth, 
institutional theorists argue that differences in growth and prosperity across nations, cities 
and regions are more fundamentally related to the type, stage of development, and efficiency 
of the economic and political institutions that underpin economic systems (Henderson and 
Wang, 2007; Farole et al., 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; 
Tomaney, 2014). Within this paradigm, the prevailing view is that differences in ‘the rules of 
the game’ across economic systems are a key driver of growth differentials (Rodrik, 2000). 
Implicit, although not always explicit, within this institutional theory of growth is that more 
efficient institutions will facilitate the development of the conditions that allow the forms of 
capital accumulation associated with endogenous theories of growth to flourish. 
In general, institutions are defined as being the humanly devised constraints that 
structure such interaction covering both formal (de jure) - rules, laws, constitutions - and 
informal (de facto) - norms, behaviour, conventions - constraints and their enforcement, 
which then define the incentive structure of societies and their economies (North, 2005). 
Institutions, especially those of a more formal nature, can be further categorised as: (1) 
economic institutions, such as individual property rights, contracts, patent laws and the like; 
or (2) political institutions, which generally refers to the extent to which democratic political 
rules underlie the nature of territorial governance (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Institutions can 
also be categorised according to whether they are innately ‘extractive’ or ‘inclusive’, with 
extractive institutions tending to be those which result in rent-seeking behaviour (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2012). 
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Two core streams of institutional literature have emerged in recent years: that 
associated with economic and political science (North, 1990); and that drawing on sociology 
and organizational theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991). The former stream is where 
institutions act through rules, procedures and agreements, whilst the latter views individuals 
as making decisions based on heuristics associated with conventions linked to shared 
cultures. Scott’s (2007) three categories of institutional forces recognises a similar division, 
with: the regulative pillar capturing rules of the game, monitoring and enforcement; the 
normative pillar drawing on socially accepted norms within professional and organisational 
interaction; with the third being a more culturally orientated cognitive pillar. The first pillar 
can be seen to be related to more formal institutions, with the second and third pillars 
associated more with the concept of informal institutions. 
The influential ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach to institutional argues that differing 
institutions develop to match the activities undertaken in an economy (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). In other words, institutions that dominate an area are partly created by the activities 
undertaken within the area. For example, this literature normally regards most continental 
European economies as Coordinated Market Economies (CME), whereby strategic 
interaction between firms and other actors such as trade unions is used to coordinate 
activities. The UK and other Anglo-Saxon nations are perceived to possess more Liberal 
Market Economies (LME), whereby markets coordinate the activities of firms and other 
actors. In their review, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) advocate that the institutions of 
democratic capitalism are the principal means for achieving prosperity, which could be 
perceived as a perspective that is ethnocentrically skewed toward the cultural values of 
nations with systems manifesting relatively strong democratic capitalism. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that capitalist economic systems are fixed within a nation, with some 
scholars suggesting the existence of regional varieties of capitalism within nation states 
(Crouch et al., 2009). 
In effect, institutions, in the shape of both the tangible and intangible characteristics 
constituting the political economy of cities and regions, and the functioning of their economic 
systems, are either enablers or constrainers on growth. Institutional enablers are the 
conditions and factors that facilitate growth by creating an environment that is conducive for 
firms to operate at their highest level. These enablers principally encompass institutions that 
support economic actors in taking advantage of perceived opportunities. While some of these 
institutions are fixed across nations, such as law, regulation, and property rights, others may 
be subject to urban and regional differentiation. In this sense, urban and regional institutions 
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can be considered to consist of the underlying rules of the game relating to factors such as the 
incentives to: save and invest; embrace competition, innovation and technological 
development; engage in education and learning; engage in entrepreneurship; participate in 
networks; along with the presence and structure of property ownership and the provision of 
public services. Enabling institutions will take account of urban and regional contextual 
factors, with complementary institutions developing through repeated interactions. 
Constraining institutions may limit the directions in which an urban economy can develop in 
the future. Therefore, choices that push places towards the development of a particular set of 
institutions over another may influence growth in the long term (Huggins et al., 2014). 
Cities with institutions conducive to enabling economic development are likely to 
increase their growth by attracting investment, skills, and talent. Some examples include: 
local business regulations, which allows commercial activity to be efficient; the ease of doing 
business; local government initiatives; and ultimately, the perceptions of businesses and 
individuals in a city (Crouch et al., 2009; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). In order to better 
understand the nature of urban economic systems and their growth performance, it appears 
useful to add these institutional factors to such system frameworks. More specifically, it 
would seem appropriate to consider the institutions that facilitate or impede the extent to 
which the capital inputs of urban economic systems are effectively transferred into high value 
outcomes. Similarly, there is a need to consider how institutions enable the transfer of 
economic outputs into high-grade outcomes. 
There are clearly different routes to achieving growth and prosperity (Kitson et al., 
2004; Malecki, 2007). Some of these routes are likely to be more attractive for some cities 
and regions than others. However, whether or not cities and regions are truly free to choose 
their economic development paths, or whether past history dictates the future potential of an 
economy is another question. The evolutionary school of economic geography suggests that 
urban and regional development and associated institutions are likely to be determined, at 
least to some extent, by past histories (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Martin and Sunley, 
2006; Boschma and Martin, 2010). Cities that are tightly bound in their structures and 
networks may not be able to move to alternative development paths, so when hit by 
exogenous shocks, they are unable to escape from a declining growth spiral (Huggins and 
Izushi, 2007; Martin and Sunley, 2006). These factors have ramifications for cities, especially 
in the long term, as activities taken to increase growth may have hidden costs in terms of the 
welfare of the population, which may compromise future growth, particularly if key workers 
cannot be retained (Florida et al., 2011; Mellander et al., 2011). The evolutionary nature of 
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urban economic development may further limit a city’s ability to move away from industries 
providing only a low contribution to growth. Institutional theorists suggest that a key means 
of escaping a downward evolutionary economic trajectory is through the development of 
institutions that facilitate effective economic development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 1990, 2005). 
Institutions also play a role in ensuring that the wealth required to improve standards 
of living replenishes the inputs of urban and regional economic systems. In a series of works, 
Rodríguez-Pose, Storper, and their colleagues (Farole et al., 2011; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006; Storper, 2005, 2008) have developed the framework of 
community – which represents a spatially localised notion of institutions – and society – 
which conversely represents spatially broader institutions – in order to better place 
institutionalist approaches central within explanations urban and regional economic 
development. In the process, this framework highlights the importance of geographical 
context when examining institutional models of growth. Both community and society are 
considered to influence economic development through the expectations and incentives 
provided to economic agents (Farole et al., 2011). However, as the authors acknowledge, how 
these effects vary across cities and regions is little understood, excepting that community and 
society effects are likely to reinforce one another (Farole et al., 2011). 
Contributions from new institutional economics have recognised the temporal nature 
of institutions, with it argued that embedded informal institutions are likely to endure far 
longer than those association with more formal governance mechanisms (Williamson, 2000; 
Rafiqui, 2009). In general, institutions introduced indigenously, and which evolve 
endogenously, are the most likely to persist over time, and are likely to be relatively ‘sticky’ 
as they will have evolved from pre-existing institutions and beliefs (Boettke et al., 2008; 
Boettke and Fink, 2011). Institutions exogenously emerging from, for example, national 
government are likely to be less sticky, and even less so in the case of institutions and 
institutional change emerging from supranational governments (Boettke and Fink, 2011). 
This emphasises the need to move beyond the notion of institutional ‘thickness’ (Amin and 
Thrift, 1995) to also consider institutional ‘stickiness’ (Boettke and Fink, 2011). 
Urban and regional institutions can be considered to consist of those that are either 
spatially inward or outward looking, with such institutions sometimes being in conflict with 
formal national level institutions, resulting in unintended consequences (Thornton, 1999). 
Where there is conflict between formal and informal institutions, North (1990) suggests that 
informal institutions determine underlying behaviour to the greatest extent. One perspective 
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is that informal and formal institutions may be substitutes for one another, and strong urban 
and regional community cultures may develop to fulfil the role of weak ineffective formal 
institutions (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2003). This means that where formal institutions no 
longer support existing activities within a city, it is not beyond possibility that the prevailing 
informal institutions may actually strengthen to fill this gap (Huggins and Thompson, 2015b). 
 
Framing Urban Growth Systems 
The above critique has suggested two potential approaches to understanding and framing 
urban and regional growth systems. As indicated, there is both some commonality and 
differences, and improved analytical strength may come from linking and combining them, 
since high capital provision provides no guarantee of significant economic growth without 
compatible high quality institutions. Also, high quality institutional provision may be of little 
benefit without appropriate capital to advantage of institutional incentivisations. Therefore, it 
would seem of theoretical and empirical value to extract and connect the particular elements 
and insights of each conceptual approach as a means of developing a fuller understanding of 
urban and regional growth processes. 
In order to being to frame an urban growth system it is necessary to consider how the 
relevant institutions and capital may be structured with regard to the organisational 
arrangements that can be said to depict a city or region (Martin, 2000; Rafiqui, 2009). 
Organisational arrangements consist of the different modes of governance that agents 
implement to support production and exchange, and are generally considered to include: 
markets, networks and firms, and the various combinations of forms that economic actors 
develop to facilitate transactions; contractual agreements that provide a framework for 
organizing activities; and the behavioural traits underlying the arrangements chosen (Ménard 
and Shirley, 2008). For the purposes of conceptualising an urban growth system, the firm as 
an organisational arrangement would appear to be fundamental building block upon which 
growth is likely to hinge. Second, the markets in which these firms undertake economic 
transactions are likely to be further guiding factors underlying the growth of a city or region. 
However, alongside market transactions, other non-market network relationships, especially 
those concerning flows of knowledge, are likely to also play a role in determining urban and 
regional growth trajectories. In this depiction, markets and networks are not alternative 
modes of governance, but are interwoven modes that are at the heart of contemporary capital 
accumulation. Therefore, the role of markets, networks and firms is to provide the 
organisational structure for capital accumulation. However, this overlooks the importance of 
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a broader organisational framework as identified by new institutional economists (Ménard 
and Shirley, 2008). In the case of a city or region, this would encompass arrangements 
concerning the political governance – in particular, the politico-economic governance – of 
these places. 
Based on these organisational arrangements, it is possible to depict a growth system 
with three interdependent levels, as shown by Figure 1: firm-level growth dynamics; inter-
firm level growth dynamics; and urban and regional level growth dynamics. The remainder of 
this section of the article seeks to flesh out and contextualise the various components of each 
of the three growth levels. 
 
Figure 1 About Here 
 
Firm-Level Growth Dynamics 
Firm-level growth dynamics concern the nature, quality and performance of firms in a city or 
region, and focuses on the interaction between relevant capital and institutions, and how this 
influences the types of firms in a city, as well as how these firms may shape the institutional 
framework and capital endowments of a city. Clearly, firms are dependent on the role of 
human capital – in the form of the skills base of a city (Lucas, 1988) - and knowledge capital 
– in the form of the technology and research expertise available for innovation (Huggins and 
Izushi, 2007), and, therefore, the learning and innovation institutions that constrain or 
incentivise the accumulation of these forms of capital. In the case of human capital, ‘learning 
institutions’ such as intra-regional and inter-regional labour markets create incentives and 
constraints as to the type of human capital formed in particular a city, as well as conventions 
in relation to workforce development and city education systems (Glaeser, 2011). For 
example, urban and regional institutions have been found to influence the movement and 
migration of human capital across urban and regional settings (Nifo and Vecchione, 2014), 
with the accumulation of capital also a factor in determining regional labour markets (Bande 
and Karanassou, 2014). 
Institutions in the form of labour markets enable human capital, in form of skilled and 
talented individuals, to take advantage of the benefits of specialisation, encouraging 
economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Therefore, there is likely to exist to a recursive 
relationship between the nature of firms in a city, as typified by patterns of economic 
specialisation, and the institutions and human capital available to the city. Similarly, others 
have argued that institutions, of either a regional, national or global kind, influence firm 
behaviour and subsequently patterns of industrial specialisation, with the relationship being 
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bi-directional in nature, i.e. firm behaviour also impacting upon relevant institutions (Crouch 
et al. 2009). On the opposite side of the coin, cities may have a more diversified portfolio of 
firms that are either related or unrelated in their ‘variety’, and recent work again suggests that 
institutions play a role in determining these patterns (Boschma and Capone, 2014). 
With regard to knowledge capital, there is a need to consider innovation institutions in 
the form of the incentives and constraints to creating and/or embracing new technology, as 
well as conventions in relation to the financing of innovation and norms regarding the 
‘restriction’ or ‘freedom’ of ideas (Storper, 2013). For example, where innovative 
opportunity exploitation is encouraged through greater rewards (e.g. lower effective tax rates) 
or at the very least are not discouraged (as might be the case where high administrative 
burdens are present), the marginal latent innovator is more likely to pursue innovation 
opportunities (Baumol et al., 2009). Although conventions in relation to the financing of 
innovation, both R&D and ‘softer’ innovation, and incentives and constraints with regard to 
undertaking differing forms of innovation - e.g. radical, incremental, technological, or social 
– are likely to stem from national and supra-national level institutions, more localised formal 
and informal institutions also play a role (Caragliu and Nijkamp, 2014; D'agostino and 
Scarlato, 2015), and a significant study by Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2015) strongly 
suggests that innovative capacity, or knowledge capital, is related to the quality of institutions 
concerning the political governance of a region. 
Alongside these formal institutions, less formal institutions in the shape of the nature 
of inter-firm competition are likely to play an equally, if not stronger role, in shaping the 
knowledge capital capacity of city. The competition conditions under which firms in a city or 
region operate are likely to shape the rate and character of innovation within the places, with 
those firms operating within the most sophisticated and demanding markets for particular 
products or services tending to be those that are most likely to possess the highest levels of 
innovation (Porter, 1990; Huggins and Izushi, 2011). Whilst such competition can be 
considered an informal institution arising from the incentives and constraints emerging from 
within an industry, in most cases it is accompanied by formal institutions in the form of 
competition policy regulations prescribed by national and supranational government that 
seeks to ensure new entrepreneurs and their firms do not face unfair obstacles when entering 
their chosen markets (Audretsch et al., 2001). These issues relating to markets and 
entrepreneurship are considered more fully as a form of inter-firm growth dynamic (see 
below). 
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Inter-Firm Level Growth Dynamics 
Organisational arrangements relating to the connection between firms through markets and 
networks form the basis of inter-firm level growth dynamics. In this case, the interaction 
between capital and institutions is considered to influence the nature of the market and 
networks within which firms in a city or region are situated, as well the extent to which these 
organisational arrangements impact upon associated capital and institutions. Inter-firm level 
growth dynamics, therefore, concern the transactions and interactions across economic 
agents, with the effectiveness of firms to enter and successfully compete in their respective 
markets being likely to rely on the accumulation of entrepreneurship capital, referring to the 
capacity of a city or region to generate entrepreneurial activity, whereby entrepreneurs are 
alert to market opportunities and subsequently contribute to economic growth (Audretsch and 
Keilbach 2004a; b). In this conceptualisation, entrepreneurship capital encompasses not only 
the available entrepreneurial talent that allows firms to operate in high value and tradable 
markets, but also the capability to access the finance entrepreneurs may require to invest in 
the resources required to engage in these markets (Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
Cities and regions with a high density of firms capable of engaging in high value and 
tradable markets tend to be those with high rates of entrepreneurial capital, with Audretsch et 
al (2012) referring to these places as possessing highly ‘entrepreneurial regional regimes’. 
Effective institutions supportive of entrepreneurship make it possible for economic actors to 
take advantage of perceived opportunities (Sautet and Kirzner, 2006; Acs et al., 2008; 
Boettke and Coyne, 2009). Entrepreneurial institutions come in the form of the incentives and 
constraints to engaging in entrepreneurial activity. Institutions may direct individuals or 
organisations towards the adoption of similar entrepreneurial practices and structures to those 
currently prevailing in a locality, ensuring they gain support and legitimacy for their actions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Etzioni, 1987; Kibler et al., 2014). In general, it is clear that the 
type of entrepreneurial activity present in a locality may also be influenced by the quality of 
institutions present (Stenholm et al., 2013). Entrepreneurial institutions encompass a wide 
range of incentives, constraints and conventions, which Henrekson and Sanandaji (2011) 
summarise as including property rights, tax codes, social insurance systems, labour market 
legislation, competition policy, trade policies, capital market regulation and the enforcement 
of contracts, and law and order. In other words, a general range of institutions impact upon 
the nature of urban and regional entrepreneurship and the markets within which these 
entrepreneurs engage. 
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A growing school of research has identified the particular role of localised and 
regional institutions in shaping entrepreneurial capital and the subsequent market orientation 
of firms (Qian et al., 2013; Fritsch and Kublina, 2015). Cities with entrepreneurially 
conducive institutions may increase their competitive advantage by attracting investment, 
skills and talent (Turok, 2004). Entrepreneurial alertness is linked to judgement, creativity 
and interpretation, and cities with strong institutional traditions with regard to 
entrepreneurship may have a competitive advantage if they are able to perpetuate this over 
time and generations (Huggins and Thompson, 2015a). In the UK, the spatial unevenness of 
financial institutions across regions has been recognised as potentially a key impediment, 
with economically weaker cities and regions being unable to improve either their 
entrepreneurial or growth prospects (Klagge and Martin; 2005; Martin et al., 2005; Hutton 
and Lee, 2012). 
At a national level, it has been found that places with better developed financial 
institutions and systems tend to grow and develop faster (Levine, 2003; 2005; Demetriades 
and Law, 2006). Indeed, the mere availability of finance is only found aid growth up to a 
certain point after which institutional constraints such as the weakening of the quality and 
effectiveness of financial intermediation take hold (Law and Singh, 2014). At a city and 
regional level, whilst the 2008-2012 financial crisis made clear the possibility of financial 
institutions having a negative impact on the growth of cities and regions with significant 
institutional activity, it is generally considered to be the case that a lack of such institutions, 
and associated capital and equity markets, in many cities and regions restricts 
entrepreneurship and subsequent growth. Equity gaps in cities and regions limit 
entrepreneurial and venture investment (Klagge and Martin, 2005; Martin et al., 2005; Sunley 
et al., 2005). As others have argued, capital markets do not function in a space-neutral way, 
and a highly centralised institutionalised system may well introduce spatial bias in the flows 
of capital to firms, leading to differing growth trajectories across cities and regions (Klagge 
and Martin, 2005; Wójcik, 2009; Turner, 2011). 
Alongside markets, recent research on agglomeration economies has identified the 
role of networks, in the form of ‘communication externalities’, as important factors that sit 
alongside externalities pertaining from human capital (Charlot and Duranton, 2006). This 
suggests that both inter and intra-city networks are themselves a type of capital shaping urban 
growth processes, i.e. network capital, in the form of investments through which firms gain 
access to knowledge to enhance expected economic returns (Huggins and Thompson, 2014; 
2015a), Work on the notion of organisational fields has focused significant attention on the 
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relational systems that link organisations into networks, whereby organisation fields consist 
of those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2007). In this case, the capital value of networks within 
and across cities is likely to be regulated by a series of ‘associational institutions’ in the form 
of conventions with regard to inter-organizational collaboration and cooperation, especially 
associational business behaviour and norms of trust and collective action (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998; Huggins and Thompson, 2014). 
Knowledge networks and the ‘easy flow of ideas’ have been argued to be one of the 
key explanatory factors underlying the reasons why cities often grow and flourish, despite a 
range of counter negative externalities being in play (Glaeser et al., 1992; Gordon, 2013). 
Cities are considered to be key locations for high rates of network formation due to the high 
density of actors and high frequency of human interactions (Glaeser, 2011). An institutional 
perspective on these networks and flows suggests that firms are incentivised to engage in 
networked activity through the availability of formal associational institutions, such as 
chambers of commerce, business and trade associations, as well more informal institutions in 
the form of the geographic clustering of firms within which networked cooperation and 
collaboration is fostered through embedded institutional norms and customs (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998; Farole et al., 2011). 
Importantly, with the rise of globalisation and agendas such as those related to city-
regions, there is an increasing acknowledgement that networked interaction is never entirely 
locally bounded. In particular, geographic clustering theory is increasingly encompassing 
more diffuse forms of agglomeration, especially with regard to the type and geographic scale 
at which external economies become manifest, and the extent to which these are shared 
across cities and the wider regions in which they are located (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). 
Given this, the network capital of firms, and the associated institutional enablers, are tending 
to evolve toward a wider spatial pattern, facilitated by new institutional mechanisms such as 
‘temporary clusters’ and ‘field configuring events’ (Huggins and Thompson, 2014). 
It should, however, be noted that there is a potential dark side to such network 
institutions and interactions, which may have a negative impact on urban and regional 
growth. In particular, the nature of competition and precarious and asymmetric relationships 
may result in network ties from negative effects may emerge, locking firms into low value 
and unproductive networks, and stifling the creation of new knowledge and innovation 
(Huggins and Thompson, 2015a). 
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Urban and Regional Level Growth Dynamics 
Urban and regional level growth dynamics relate to organisational arrangements concerning 
the overall governance of urban political economies, especially with regard to institutions 
concerning the ownership of urban and regional assets, in particular physical capital. In 
general, there is a growing recognition that the institutions impacting upon the ownership of 
capital play an increasingly important role in determining economic outcomes (Piketty, 2014; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Although a plethora of factors are highlighted in the 
emerging literature, those with relevance to the urban context include: the public or private 
ownership of land and infrastructure (Pacione, 2013); the provision of public services; the 
provenance of public and private business and home ownership (Rodriguez-Pose, 2013); as 
well as rules with regard to industrial relations, corporate governance and rent seeking 
behaviour (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
In their essay on the institutions of ownership in the UK, Hutton and Lee (2012) argue 
that over many years a failure in the structure of the national institutions of ownership of both 
public and private sector assets, in particular a lack of diversity in ownership and the location 
of ownership, has led to contemporary patterns of uneven development. In this context, 
contemporary low growth cities and regions are likely to have suffered from past economic 
and political institutions that were innately ‘extractive’ (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), with 
the power underlying any prosperity generated lying in the hands of a small, and often 
spatially external, elite. 
As others have found, national institutional frameworks interact with their more 
localised institutional counterparts through a range of channels and mechanisms (Gertler, 
2003; Farole et al., 2011), with the strength of these channels being mediated by the location 
and reach of particular institutions (Storper, 2013). In recent ground-breaking research, 
Charron et al. (2014) find significant differences in the institutions associated with political 
governance across the regions of European Union member states based on the ‘quality’ of 
local forms of governance. This suggests that political governance is a relational phenomenon 
incorporating institutional factors at a range of spatial scales and distances. In this vein, Pike 
et al. (2015) illustrate how the institutions of governance concerning local economic 
development in England operate through not only multiple agents, but also multi-scalar 
institutional settings that are frequently the targets of government imposed institutional 
change. Therefore, although much of the political governance of cities and regions will lie 
with national government, clearly local, city and regional governments are likely to have a 
range of powers to impact upon economic growth, with one of most important being that 
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relating to physical capital and land use regulations, especially with regard to investment in 
infrastructure projects (Storper, 2013). 
As well as infrastructure projects that directly impact upon a city’s economic 
prospects, a more indirect role of urban and regional government is its role in determining 
physical capital as manifest by the housing stock of a city. As Duranton and Puga (2013) 
suggest, the fact that housing stock is a very durable form of capital means that it is an 
important factor in shaping the economic evolution of cities. For example, the amount of land 
made available by local government for housing development may be a factor in determining 
the subsequent prices of homes in a city or region (Storper, 2010). Indeed, the effect of land 
use decisions with regard to housing are likely to be heightened in coming years with 
growing trends in many cities for rearranging intra-urban space according to strategies 
concerning the revitalisation of selected places within a city (Harvey, 1974; Scott, 2014), 
with the emergence of subsequent gentrification impacts accompanying volatile changes in 
house prices. 
Furthermore, as the capital accumulation model of growth is dependent on the savings 
and consumption propensities of communities (Kaldor, 1957), the decisions of urban and 
regional political governance with regard to housing and land use policy may impact on the 
savings and consumption propensities of it local communities through its role in determining 
housing patterns and prices (Campbell and Cocco, 2007). In recent years, little attention 
appears to have been given to differences in savings and consumption rates across cities and 
regions, although research from the 1990s in the UK and Canada suggests significant 
differences, with such differences having potentially important implications for regional 
growth and development (Murrell, 1993; Muellbauer and Murphy, 1994). More recent 
research has also found that differences in consumption activities are to be found across 
regional contexts in the UK (Johnston, 2011). 
 
Institutional Reproduction, Change and Decay 
Urban growth systems and their various components are evolutionary systems within which 
institutions will reproduce themselves, change or decay, particularly as economic conditions 
change, as represented by the feedback mechanism shown in Figure 1. The generation of new 
capital may reinforce existing institutions that may be positive or negative in its outcome. It 
may help sustain institutions that promote growth or it may entrench institutions that possess 
rent-seeking traits resulting in low rates of growth, or growth that is not equitable for a city or 
region as a whole. With changes in economic conditions, institutions considered effective at 
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one point in time may be less appropriate at other times (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). This hints at 
the requirement for institutional flexibility as a means of responding to economic change. As 
Rodríguez-Pose (2013) argues, although institutions may promote opportunities for economic 
growth, they may also result in systems with low growth trajectories, whereby a city or 
region is locked-in to institutions that are unable to adapt to changing economic conditions. 
Bathelt and Glückler (2014) similarly note the evolutionary and potentially path-dependent 
nature of the relationship between economic interaction and institutions, resulting in both 
intended and unintended consequences that impact on existing institutions in terms of their 
decay or the enactment of new institutions. These perspectives confirm that the types of 
interaction between capital and institutions across the three levels identified above will be 
evolutionary in nature. 
 
Empirically Analysing Urban Growth Systems 
This section aims to provide pointers as to how the theoretical framework presented above 
may be operationalised in an empirical manner from both a quantitative and qualitative 
perspective. Returning to the endogenous models outlined earlier, the analysis presented 
above indicates that alongside the roles of human, knowledge and physical capital, account 
should also be taken of a city or region’s stock of both entrepreneurship capital and network 
capital in order to capture the inter-firm growth dynamics at play within and across cities and 
regions. Therefore, a more complete model would consist of: 
 
Yc = F(Hc, Rc, Ec, Nc, Kc)      (3) 
 
Where E= a city’s stock of entrepreneurship capital, and N = its network capital. 
Empirically it is a relatively straight forward task to measure the stock of each capital 
asset type at the urban and regional level, with human capital usually measured by rates of 
educational or skill attainment, knowledge capital by expenditure on R&D activity, 
entrepreneurship capital by the stock of new start-up firms, network capital by the level of 
knowledge-based ties and frequency of interactions, and physical capital by indicators such 
as the value of existing infrastructure and gross fixed capital formation. 
At this stage, however, the model takes no account of the nature of institutions. Given 
this, a key question with regard to articulating an empirical methodology is: how might we 
best define how ‘good’ or ‘successful’ particular institutions are? Although terms such as 
‘thickness’ and ‘stickiness’ give us an indication of the nature of institutions, they do not 
19 
 
necessarily measure their effectiveness. In this case it would seem appropriate to refer to the 
‘quality’ of institutions (Charron et al., 2014), particularly their quality in incentivising the 
accumulation of the capital forms leading to economic growth. Therefore, the type of capital 
accumulated in a city or region, and the quality of associated institutions, will define the 
nature of its growth system. However, unlike the relatively straight forward task of measuring 
stocks of capital, the difficulties in measuring the quality of institutions means that there have 
been few attempts to incorporate institutions into urban and regional growth models. One 
notable exception is that of Stimson et al. (2009) who introduce ‘institution’ and ‘leadership’ 
variables into a regional endogenous model. This represents a particularly novel 
development, and in this line the five institutional forms identified above facilitate a further 
extension of their approach: 
 
Yc = F[(Hc, LIc)(Rc, IIc)(Ec, EIc)(Nc, AIc)(Kc OIc)]   (4) 
 
In this extended formulation, institutions enter equation (4) as follows: LI = quality of the 
learning institutions in city c; II = quality of the innovation institutions; EI = quality of the 
entrepreneurial institutions; AI = quality of the associational institutions; and OI = quality of 
the institutions of ownership. In this case, the term (Hc, LIc)(Rc, IIc) is a measure of the firm-
level growth dynamics of city c, the term (Ec, EIc)(Nc, AIc) is a measure of the inter-firm level 
growth dynamics; and the term (Kc OIc) a measure of urban and regional level growth 
dynamics. However, an outstanding issue for future empirical research strategies is the extent 
to which it is possible to assign quantitative measures that identify the relative quality of 
different institutional features, and whilst some existing indicators may act as useful proxies, 
new data collection is likely to be necessary in many contexts. 
 Indeed, a deeper understanding of the role of institutions means that any quantitative 
analysis should ideally be complemented by a more qualitative assessment of the variation in 
the types of institutions and their quality across cities and regions. The means by which 
institutions and their quality can be measured is a matter that continues to challenge 
institutional economists, with no clear methodology emerging beyond trying to identify 
relevant and robust proxies (Robinson, 2013; Voigt, 2013). Perhaps the most promising route 
forward is to relate behavioural changes among a particular community, in this case a city or 
region, to institutions and institutional arrangements that are likely to promote or constrain 
particular types of behaviour, in this case that associated with the facilitation of economic 
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growth. Where significant positive behavioural changes occur, and no significant external 
‘noise’ is identified, it could be argued that institutions are of a relatively ‘high’ quality. 
In a recent analysis of the contemporary growth patterns of cities and urban areas in 
the UK, Martin et al. (2014) find that, with only a few exceptions, high growth almost 
exclusively occurs in the south of England, especially the cities and regions in and around 
London and the Greater South East. On the other hand, those cities and urban regions with 
the lowest recorded economic growth are exclusively situated in the more northern quarters 
of the UK. This suggests significant differences in the growth systems across each type of 
city and region. As means of beginning to consider these differences from a qualitative 
perspective Table 1 summarises some of the key capital and institutional features that 
distinguish high from low growth cities and urban regions. In the south, urban growth 
systems are relatively high in terms of capital accumulation and institutional quality across 
the three levels, being rich in terms of the availability of human and knowledge capital, and 
enabling institutions. 
Similarly, they possess high quality institutions and rates of capital in relation to 
organisational arrangements concerning markets, networks and political governance. Based 
on this, these cities and regions can be said to typify urban growth systems that are far more 
likely to result in relatively high rates of long-term economic growth. Unfortunately, the 
relative paucity of capital and high quality institutions across the cities and regions in the 
north leads to them being categorised as possessing low growth urban systems. In a 
comparative study of two cities in the UK – Cambridge (‘south’) and Swansea (‘north’) –
Simmie and Martin (2010) identify a number of similar differences in growth systems traits 
to those found more broadly across high and low growth cities. 
 
Table 1 About Here 
 
Conclusion 
This article has presented a systems-based approach to connecting endogenous capital 
accumulation and institutional theories of urban and regional growth as a means of 
delineating a framework to better understand how investment in capital assets, especially 
intangible assets, are related to the institutions underlying the economic functioning of cities 
and regions. In the past, both capital accumulation and institutional theories of growth and 
development have been criticised by some scholars for their lack of explanatory power 
(Glaeser et al., 2004; Chang, 2011), which is perhaps a result of each theory being viewed 
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somewhat in isolation. A meshing of these theoretical approaches, however, indicates that 
urban and regional growth is a highly endogenous, recursive and evolutionary process 
whereby the interaction between capital and institutions at a number of different, yet 
interdependent, levels of organisational arrangement may offer more explanatory power. 
Clearly, this will require more formal empirical modelling to determine, although an on-
going problem in this respect is how to best measure institutions (Voigt, 2013). Indeed, part 
of the problem with some empirical studies concerning the role of institutions is that it is not 
always clear whether or not the proxy measures employed to capture institutional 
‘performance’ are fit-for purpose (Shirley, 2013). Moving forward, amongst urban and 
regional scholars there is an opportunity to develop further institutional economic thinking 
that seeks to capture ‘institutional quality’. 
Cities will continue to act as laboratories for entrepreneurship and innovation, and 
future policymaking would do well to recognise that increasing the stock of associated 
intangible capital alone is unlikely to produce significant increases in economic growth 
unless high quality institutions are in place. Storper (2010) argues that it is difficult to 
propose a ‘varieties of city capitalism’ in a similar manner to that employed by those 
analysing institutions in a comparative manner across nations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Nevertheless, by identifying the connection between types of institutions and forms of 
‘growth capital’, it is possible to consider distinct varieties in the economic growth systems 
and models at play across cities and regions. Within an economic environment whereby intra-
regional economic unevenness has become as manifest as the long-time recognition of inter-
regional unevenness, a key issue for both theorists and policymakers is to understand how the 
institutional structure of a city or region promotes economic growth that is as equitable as 
possible, and avoids the forms of rent-seeking by economic and political actors that often 
undermines long-term and sustainable economic growth. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the economic growth system framed in this article 
does not encompass some of the deeper rooted determinants of growth and development 
stemming from the socio-spatial cultural or social capital traits of a city or region (Putnam, 
2000; Huggins and Thompson, 2016). In this case, whilst institutions can be considered to be 
the rules of the game governing growth processes, cultural and social traits encompass the 
extent to which such rules are adhered to, as well as the way in which they foster future 
institutional change. Nor does the article seek to frame wider development goals beyond 
economic growth, such as those related to social development, well-being, and the 
sustainable environmental development of cities and regions. Although these factors are vital 
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features when considering urban and regional development in the round, they fall outside the 
contemporary capital and institutional drivers framing urban and regional economic growth 
systems. 
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Figure 1: Framing Urban Growth Systems 
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Table 1: General Features of Economic Growth Systems in High and Low Growth Cities of the 
UK 
 High Growth Cities Low Growth Cities 
Firm-Level Growth Dynamics  
Human Capital Evolving global talent centre, fuelled by 
‘brain attraction’ 
Stagnant and relatively low 
skills base, compounded by 
‘brain drain’ 
Knowledge Capital Rich base of knowledge workers, 
technology, and expertise 
Lack of knowledge workers 
and associated technology and 
expertise 
Learning Institutions Dense and flexible labour markets Weak labour markets 
 
Innovation 
Institutions 
High density of public and private sector 
engagement in innovation 
Low density of public and 
private sector engagement in 
innovation 
   
Inter-Firm Level Growth Dynamics  
Entrepreneurship 
Capital 
High rates of entrepreneurship and 
associated venture finance 
Below average (national) rates 
of entrepreneurship and venture 
finance 
Network Capital High incidence of business network 
formation and knowledge flows 
Relatively low rates of business 
network formation and 
knowledge flows 
Entrepreneurial 
Institutions 
Plentiful opportunity to access 
entrepreneurial support mechanisms 
Lack of opportunity to access 
entrepreneurial support 
mechanisms 
Associational 
Institutions 
Strong industrial clustering, especially 
among firms operating in highly tradable 
markets 
Lack of strong industry clusters 
   
Urban and Regional Level Growth Dynamics  
Physical Capital Strong infrastructure, transport systems 
and built environment 
Weak and dated infrastructure 
Institutions of 
Ownership 
History of inclusive institutions - centre of 
public ownership, especially since 1970s. 
Key location for the head-quarters of large 
domestic and international firms 
History of extractive 
institutions - extractive 
industries, dependency on the 
branch plant activity of 
international firms 
 
